In this article, we describe a new architecture providing the access control service in both ATM and IP−over−ATM networks. This architecture is based on management agents distributed in network equipment. Several examples are given illustrating the benefits of this architecture. The comparison with other approaches shows that this architecture provides big improvements in ATM−level access control, scalability and QoS preservation.
INTRODUCTION
In the recent past, much attention has been paid to develop security services for ATM networks. This resulted in the creation of many working groups within (and outside) the standardization bodies. One of them is the security Working Group of the ATM Forum created in 1995, which is to the point to release its version 1.0 specifications. Confidentiality, authentication, integrity and some kind of access−control have been considered. Access control as defined by the ISO in [7498−2] is a security service used to protect resources against an unauthorized use.
The ATM technology has been specified to transport various kinds of flows and allows users to specify the QoS (Quality of Service) applying to these flows. Communications are connection oriented and a signaling protocol is used to set up, control and release connections. In this article we show that the classical approach supplying the access control service (commonly called firewall) is unable to preserve the QoS. We then describe a new access control architecture for ATM and IP−over−ATM networks which does not alter the negotiated QoS. The next section analyses the current solutions providing the access control service in the ATM and IP over ATM networks. Section 3 describes the way to retrieve access control information from the MIBs (Management Infor− mation Bases) and to provide the access control service through our access control architecture. As a conclusion we make a comparison between our solution and other proposed approaches and we show that our architecture is a good alternative to current solutions.
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Several solutions have been proposed in order to provide some kind of access−control in ATM and IP over ATM networks. This section is divided into three parts. In the first part we consider the adaptation of the internet «classical» firewall architecture to ATM networks. In the second part we describe the solution proposed by the ATM Forum. In the third part we show various solutions proposed to improve the «classical» firewall solution.
Classical solution
The first solution [Ran92] is to use a classical firewall located between the internal and public networks in order to provide access−control at the packet, circuit and application levels. As such the ATM network is considered as a level 2 OSI layer offering point to point connections. As a result access−control at the ATM level is not possible and end to end QoS is no longer guaranteed. At the IP and circuit levels, IP packets are reassembled from the ATM cells. Access−control is supplied using the information embedded in the TCP, UDP and IP headers. Packets are filtered by comparing the fields in the headers such as the source and destination addresses, the source and destination ports, the direction and the TCP flags with a pattern of prohibited and allowed packets. Prohibited packets are destroyed whereas allowed packets are forwarded from one interface to the other. When the same QoS is 3 negotiated on both sides of the firewall, the end to end QoS may be modified in the following ways:
• Reassem bl y, routi ng, fi l teri ng and deassem bl y operati ons i ncrease the C el l Transi t D el ay.
• Internal operati ons done over IP packets m ay i ncrease the Cel l Loss Rati o.
• The ti m e spent to reassem bl e and deassem bl e the packets i s proporti onal to the packets si zes, w hi ch are vari abl e. A s a result, the Cel l Transi t D el ay Vari ati on m ay be di fferent from the CTD V val ue negoti ated on each si de of the fi rew all .
• Routi ng and fi l teri ng acti ons operate at the softw are l evel . Thus the l oad of the system m ay cause vari ati ons i n the Peak, Sustai nabl e and M i ni m um C el l Rate.
Application procedures are then filtered at the application level by proxy applications in accordance with the security policy. Like with the IP or circuit level filters, the QoS is affected, but much more strongly, since the traffic has to reach the application level. Moreover since the filtering operations are provided in a multitasking environment, a desynchronization between the flows can occur. This kind of solution is reported to have performance problems in high speed networks environment ([Data97] , [JA98] ). The latest tests ([KL98]) show that this access control solution is unsuccessful at the OC−3 speed (155Mb/s).
2.2
The access control service as considered by the ATM Forum
The access−control service as defined in the ATM Forum specifications ([SEC1.0]) is based on the access−control service provided in the A and B orange book classified systems. In this approach one sensitivity level per object and one authorization level per subject are defined. Those levels include a hierarchical level (e.g. public, secret, top secret...) and a set of domains modeling the domains associated with the information (e.g. management, research, education...). A subject may access an object if the level of the subject is greater than the level of the object and one of the domain associated with the subject includes one of the domain associated with the object. In the ATM Forum specifications, the sensitivity and authorization levels are coded as a label, which is associated to the data being transmitted. This label may be sent embedded into the signaling, or as user data prior to any user data exchanges. The access−control is operated by the network equipment which verifies that the sensitivity level of the data complies with the authorization level assigned to the links and interfaces over which the data are transmitted. The main advantage of this solution is its scalability since the access control decision is made at the connection setup and doesn't interfere with the user data. However it suffers from the following drawbacks:
• The netw ork equi pm ent i s assum ed to m anage sensi ti vi ty and authori zati on l evel s. Thi s i s not provi ded i n current netw ork equi pm ent.
• A connecti on should be set up for each sensiti vi ty l evel .
• The access−control servi ce as consi dered i n traditi onal fi rew all s (i . e. access−control to hosts, servi ces) i s vol untari l y l eft outsi de the scope of the speci fi cati on.
Specific solutions
The above limitations have been identified and many proposals have been made in order to supply the «traditional» access−control service in ATM networks. These solutions may be classified into two classes: industrial and academic solutions.
Industrial solutions
The first industrial solution (Cisco, Fore) uses a classical ATM switch that is modified to filter ATM connection set up requests based on the source and destination addresses. The problem with this approach is that the access− control is not powerful since the parameters are very limited.
The second one (Storagetek) is also based on an ATM switch, however this switch has been modified to supply access−control at the IP level. Instead of reassembling cells for packets headers examination like in traditional firewalls, this approach is expected to find IP and TCP/UDP information directly in the first ATM cell being transmitted over the connection. This approach prevents delays to be introduced during cell switching. Storagetek has also developed a specific memory called CAM (Content Addressable Memory) designed to speed up the research in the access−control policy. This approach is the first one taking into account the limitations introduced by the classical firewall approach. However some problems have not yet been solved:
• A ccess−control i s l i m i ted to the netw ork and transport l evel s. A TM and appl i cati on l evel s are not consi dered.
• IP packets i ncl udi ng opti ons are not fi l tered si nce opti ons m ay shi ft the U D P/TC P i nform ati on i n the second cel l . Thi s causes a seri ous securi ty fl aw .
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• The devi ce i s not easy to m anage especi al l y w hen dynam i c connecti ons are required, si nce connecti on fi l ters have to be confi gured m anual l y.
• Perform ances of the devi ce are not very scal abl e. A n O C−12 (622 M b/s) versi on of thi s product has been announced i n 1996 but i s not yet exhi bi ted.
Academic solutions
Both academic solutions being proposed are based on the above Storagetek architecture, but they introduce some improvements to cope with Storagetek problems.
The first approach [Da98] uses a FPGA specialized circuit associated to a modified switch architecture. At the ATM level, the access control at connection establishment is improved by providing filtering capabilities based on the source and destination addresses. This approach also allows ATM level PNNI (Private Network to Network Interface) routing information to be filtered. At the IP and circuit levels the access−control service is similar to this provided by the Storagetek product. This solution is interesting since it is the most complete solution being currently implemented. However it suffers from many limitations:
• Speci al IP packets (e. g. packets w i th opti onal fi el ds i n the header) are not processed.
• O nl y a sm al l part of the i nform ati on suppl i ed by the si gnal i ng (i . e. source and desti nati on addresses) i s used.
• A ccess−control at the appl i cati on l evel i s not consi dered.
The second approach [XS97] is the most complete architecture being currently proposed. This solution provides many improvements over the Storagetek architecture. The most interesting idea is the classification of the traffic. The traffic is classified into four classes depending on the ATM connection QoS descriptors and on the processing allowed to be done over it. Class A provides a basic ATM access−control. ATM connections are filtered according to the information provided by the signaling (i.e. source and destination addresses). Class B provides traffic monitoring. The analysis of the traffic is made on a copy of the flow. When a packet is prohibited, the reply to this packet is blocked. Class C is associated with packet filtering. IP and transport packet headers are reassembled from the ATM cells and analysed. During this analysis the last cell belonging to the packet called LCH (Last Cell Hostage) is kept in memory by the switch. The analysis should be at least faster than the time spent by the whole packet to cross the switch. When the packet is allowed, the LCH is released, but when the packet is prohibited the LCH is modified so that a CRC error occurs and the
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packet is rejected. For class D, the access control processing is similar to the firewall proxy's. This classification expects the switch to separate traffics with QoS requirements from traffics without QoS requirements. As such the traffic with QoS requirements is allowed to cross the switch without being delayed. Table 1 gives the filtering operations depending on the level implementing the access control and the traffic QoS requirements. This approach is interesting since it introduces many improvements (traffic classification, LCH) over all the other proposed solutions. However some problems remain:
• Few param eters are used to suppl y the access control servi ce at the A TM l evel .
• A ccess control i s not provi ded at the appl i cati on l evel for appl i cati ons requiring Q oS.
• Traffi c m oni tori ng onl y appl i es to connecti on ori ented com m uni cati ons, and U D P packets can not be fi l tered usi ng thi s techni que.
• Thi s archi tecture i s com pl ex so that i t i s l i kel y that scal abi l i ty i s not offered • N o i m pl em entati on has been exhi bi ted.
The problems most oftenly met are the lack of scalability and the impact on QoS introduced by the access control service. As a consequence, it appears interesting to develop a scalable architecture that could provide the access control service while maintaining the negotiated QoS.
AN AGENT BASED ACCESS CONTROL ARCHITECTURE
The goal of our architecture is to provide a scalable access−control service without altering the QoS negotiated for a connection. We selected a distributed architecture approach to have more scalability than in a
• Securi ty l evel i m provem ent . For an i ntruder to control the w hol e netw ork, i t i s necessary to subvert al l the access control devi ces one after the other.
• Protecti on agai nst i nternal attacks. Internal attacks can be avoi ded and detected si nce al l the devi ces are protected.
•
A di stri buted archi tecture i s not prone to these attacks si nce al l the necessary i nform ati on about the connecti ons can be found on the end devi ces them sel ves.
• Perform ances i m provem ent . For central i zed devi ces to fi l ter traffi c, i t i s necessary to reassem ble fram es and packets i n order to i sol ate fl ow s that require fi l teri ng. A s such, overhead i s i ntroduced by the controll er. O n the other hand, i n a di stri buted archi tecture, the traffi c i s natural l y reassem bl ed. A s a consequence, the access control processi ng i ntroduces m uch l ess overhead than i n the centrali zed approach.
• Scal abi l i ty i m provem ent . The access control processi ng can be di stri buted over several devi ces. A s a resul t, very hi gh rates can be supported, w i thout needi ng a pow erful centrali zed devi ce.
• Effi ci ency i m provem ent . A s m enti oned i n secti on 1 m any protocol stacks can be used above the A TM m odel . Provi di ng access control m echani sm s for al l these protocol s on a si ngl e devi ce i s not very effi ci ent. In a di stributed archi tecture, access control m echani sm s and access control pol i cy can be speci fi c to the protocol stack bei ng used. Thi s resul ts i n a l ess com pl ex and thus m ore effi ci ent equi pm ent.
A distributed framework has also some disadvantages. It is more difficult to manage. Detecting attacks against several devices requires each device to cooperate with one another, which is not an easy task. The main disadvantage is that every device on the network has to be modified in order to supply the access control service. Another problem with a distributed architecture is the mean to exchange access control information. In section 3.2 we show that Management Information Bases (MIBs) provide useful information from an access control point of view. Section 3.3 then shows how this information can be used by a modified management agent in order to supply the access control service. Finally section 3.4 gives some indication to solve the problem of managing the distributed architecture.
Management information Bases
Using the MIBs for security services provision is not new. The most common use is in the field of the intrusion detection. For example [TIB95] suggests to use information provided by the IETF MIBs in order to detect intrusions in a local area network.
[AD97] proposed to introduce the time parameter in MIBs in order to improve intrusion detection techniques. MIBs have also been used to manage access control ( [Kar98] ) and to supply the access control service ( [SKM97] ).
In the field of local area network most of management information has been specified by the IETF and the ATM−Forum. The management framework relies on four simple concepts. The management platform provides an interface between management data and the network manager. It also provides an interface allowing the network manager to get and set management information on remote agents. The management platform is also able to analyse the data received from the agents thanks to specific software. Management information is stored on a local database called Management Information Base (MIB). The management agent is the other active element of this framework. The agent manages a set of physical or logical objects through their logical representation. This representation is coded using the Structure of Management Information (SMI) and stored in a MIB. Through this representation, the agent is able to configure and supervise physical devices. The agent is also able to send information to the management platform asynchronously when an unusual event occurs on a supervised device. The management station and the management agent communicate through a protocol called SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol).
Many MIBs have been specified in order to manage network protocols and applications. In this part we will only consider MIBs used to manage IP or ATM networks. In order to avoid a long list of management objects, only scenarios illustrating the information to be used and the way to use it are given. Interested readers can find a more complete analysis in [PL98] . Those scenarios present typical rules from the real world. Each scenario applies to a single level in the protocol stack (ATM, Transport, Application).
Example 1; Restricting access to an ATM video server.
The ATM−MIB has been specified by the IETF in 1994 and gives general information about ATM connections. Since this MIB is quite old, a new MIB ([AToM98]) defining additional information is currently being discussed in the AToMib working group at the IETF. In this scenario, the goal is to prevent external users to access an internal video server while allowing internal users to use it. Thus we have to identify connections between the video client and the video server. These connections are identified by three parameters: the client ATM address, the server ATM address and the VoD application identifier. These parameters can be retrieved from the ATM2−MIB objects ([AToM98]), namely:
• The atm Vcl A ddrTabl e and atm A ddrV cl Tabl e obj ects provi de the source and desti nati on addresses for each connecti on through the atm Vcl A ddrA ddr obj ect.
• The VoD appl i cati on can be uni quel y i denti fi ed by a set of param eters. Example 2; Prohibiting telnet from the internet to internal hosts.
[RFC2012] and [RFC2013] define two MIBs in order to manage TCP and UDP communications. Like in the previous example, connections between the telnet client and the telnet server have to be identified. These connections are described by four parameters: the client and server IP addresses, the client source port and the server destination port. The client source port value may vary in time but the server destination port is fixed to value 23. Those parameters can be retrieved from the following TCP−MIB objects:
• The tcpConnTabl e gi ves the desti nati on and source addresses and ports through the tcpConnLocal A ddress, tcpConnLocal Port, tcpConnRem A ddress and tcpConnRem Port obj ects.
Example 3; Prohibiting root remote connections.
Information
• The i dentTabl e defi ned i n the RFC 1414−M I B gi ves the user ID through the i dentU serid obj ect.
• The sysA pplEl m tRunTabl e defi ned i n the sysA ppl M I B [RFC 2287] provi des the process and the user associ ated w i th an appl i cati on through the sysA pplEl m tRunN am e, sysA pplEl m tRunU ser and sysA pplEl m tRunIndex obj ects.
As such, it is possible to build a matching between a process and an application through the user name and the connection parameters. The connection parameters (source and destination ports) are used to make the matching with the processes. The other connection parameters (source and destination addresses) are used to check which connections are targeted to external hosts.
Access control enforcement
Our architecture is based on a modified management agent. This agent can be located on a terminal or on an intermediate device as described in figure 1 . The agent has to be modified in order to introduce the access control operations. It periodically polls the objects described in section 3.2. It then compares the value of these objects with the allowed values. The allowed values describe part of the access control policy to be applied in that agent. Thus the allowed values may vary from one agent to another. In order to determine the prohibited and allowed values, the agent includes a containing a set of access control rules. When prohibited values are detected, the agent interacts with the protocol stack in order to stop the prohibited action. Stopping the prohibited action can take several forms:
• A t the appl i cati on l evel : Interrupti ng the process executi ng the prohi bi ted operati on. Thi s can be used to provi de appl i cati on l evel access control .
• A t the transport l evel : Bl ocki ng the prohi bi ted com m uni cati on by releasi ng the relevant connecti on. Thi s m ethod can onl y be used for connecti on ori ented com m uni cati ons (TC P).
• A t the A TM l evel : Bl ocki ng the prohi bi ted com m uni cati on by releasi ng the connecti on w hen dynam i c connecti ons are used, or by di sconfi guri ng the relevant i nterface for perm anent connecti ons are em pl oyed. Thi s m ethod can be useful w hen A TM l evel access control or transport connecti onl ess access control (U D P/ ICM P) i s requi red.
Our architecture has the following advantages:
• The i nform ati on used to provi de the access control servi ce i s exam i ned asynchronousl y by the agent at the appl i cati on l evel . Thus no i m pact on the Q oS can be i nduced.
• The m odi fi cati ons of the system provi di ng the access control servi ce are sm al l . O nl y the m anagem ent agent has to be changed.
However selecting the polling rate may not be easy. Indeed a too short interval of polling introduces unuseful overhead for the system whereas a too long interval of polling decreases the security level provided by the agent since some events described by the MIBs will be missed by the agent thus introducing possible security flaws.
Access control management
As explained in section 3.1 a distributed architecture is quite difficult to manage. To solve this management problem, the three elements depicted in figure 3 are defined.
The Access Control management application.
The Access Control management application is responsible for configuring each agent with the relevant access control rules. In order to perform that task the manager:
• Reads the A ccess Control Pol i cy. Thi s pol i cy can be stored on a l ocal fi l e or com pl eted through a graphi cal m anagem ent i nterface.
• Sel ects the rules that shoul d be appl i ed i n the agents to be confi gured.
A gents l ocated on term i nal devi ces hol d rules concerni ng thei r ow n securi ty, w hereas rules l ocated on i nterm edi ate netw ork devi ces can appl y to vari ous equi pm ent.
• Codes these rules accordi ng to agent M I B syntax.
• Transfers thi s i nform ati on to the A ccess Control A gent.
The access control management application should also retrieve access control results from the agents and should analyse them to detect distributed attacks. The Access Control MIB.
The access control MIB is located on the access control agent device and is remotely managed by the manager through the agent. This MIB includes both access control information, and results from the access control process. Access control information can be classified into three tables, a table at the  ATM level, a table at the transport level and a table at the application level.  Each table contains access control parameters relative the host holding the  table (when this host is an end device) or to many hosts (when the host is an internal network device). Each table includes a set of rules and each rule is described using a generic format. Access control results are stored into two distinct tables. The first one describes the communications that have been blocked. The second one describes various security alarms. The MIB size remains relatively small because of the generic format of the rules and because it only contains information about the security of the host.
The Management Protocol
The management protocol used to carry information between the access control manager and the access control agent has to supply several services.
• Integri ty. A ccess control m anagem ent i nform ati on shoul d not be m odi fi ed duri ng thei r transfer betw een the m anager and the agent. 
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• A uthenti cati on and access control. O nl y authori zed users should be al l ow ed to access the access control i nform ati on stored on the hosts. The i denti ty of the al l ow ed users m ust be guaranteed usi ng the authenti cati on service.
• Confi denti al i ty. O nl y authori zed users should be abl e to read access control i nform ati on duri ng i ts transfer over the netw ork.
The SNMPv2 [Sta93] and SNMPv3 [Ba98] protocols seem to be good candidates since they supply all these services.
4.

CONCLUSION
As a conclusion, table 2 compares all the competing approaches designed to provide access control on both ATM and IP over ATM networks. • G ood m anageabi l i ty through a m anagem ent and securi ty i ntegrated approach.
This work could be usefully continued in two directions. The first direction is its implementation since this might give us interesting feedback on the real performance and security level provided by the architecture. The second direction is the extension of our architecture to other types of networks because our architecture can easily be adapted to other kinds of network that are based on a layer 2 switching and that consider QoS as an important constraint.
5.
